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- I. REFS PROVIDE HELPFUL INSIGHT INTO US MISSION THINKING
 RE CURRENT CAMBODIAN DEVELOPMENTS. WE ENDORSE YOUR REF A
 COMMENT THAT REF B SHOWS SCALE OF COORDINATION PROCESS. WE
 WILLD APPRECIATE PRECIS OF EXCISED ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS
 OR IDENTIFICATION OF MOZNAXAMON BACK CHANNEL MESSAGE BY WHICH
 BUNKER SENT THEM TO WASHINGTON.
- 2. PARAS 17 AND 18 REF B STRIKE US AS UNDERPLAYING A MOST IMPORTANT POINT. IN 7 APRIL SESSION WITH SECRETARY LARD AND OTHER CONVERSATIONS DOWNTOWN IN RECENT DAYS, I HAVE ARGUED (THILGU'S)
 FOLLOWING THESIS: IN THIỆU'S EXTE CO TED EXISTENCE OF YO/NVA SANCTUARTES IN CAMBODIA (AND, TO LESSER EXITINT, LAOS) WILL

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INEVITABLY LIMIT SUCCESS OF EVEN OPTIMUM INTERNAL VIETNAMIZATION PROGRAM. REGARDLESS OF PROGRESS THAT MIGHT BE ACHIEVED IN STRENGTHENING SOUTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY AND POLICE STRUCTURE AND IMPROVING INTERNAL POLITICAL ORGANIZATION, TRUE INTERNAL SECURITY WILL REMAIN UNATTAINABLE SO LONG AS COMMUNISTS CAN EVILLD AND STATION LARGE MILITARY FORCES IN SANCTUARIES CLOSE TO MAJOR SOUTH VIETNAMESE POPULATION CENTERS, FORCES THAT CAN ALWAYS SALLY FORTH AT TIMES AND PLACES OF HANOIS CHOOSING. THIEU HAS MADE THIS POINT TO MANY PEOPLE OVER THE PAST YEAR. HE PITCHED IT VERY STRONGLY TO ME DURING OUR CONVERSATION LAST NOVEMBER.

3. THINKING AS HE DOES, GIVEN HIS OWN PERSONAL OUTLOOK
AND TEMPERAMENT, AND GIVEN THE FACT THAT, IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS
THIEU SEES HIMSELF AS THE CUSTODIAN OF SOUTH VIETNAM'S NATIONAL
INTERESTS (NOT ANYONE ELSE'S), THIEU COULD HARDLY AVOID VIZ (ING
POST-18 MARCH EVENTS IN CAMBODIA AS A HEAVEN-SENT WINDFALL THAT

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SOUTH VIETNAM SIMPLY CANNOT AFFORD TO SQUANDER. FOR A BRIEF TIME AT LEAST, HANOI'S CAMBODIAN SANCTUARIES AND THE COMMUNIST FORCES THEREIN -- I.E., THE REALLY SERIOUS LONG RANGE INTERNAL SECURITY THREAT TO SOUTH VIETNAM -- ARE NO LONGER IMMUNE TO HARASSMENT. WHILE THIS SUN SHINES, THIEU IS GOING TO MAKE SOME HAY. HE MAY MAKE IT QUIETLY, BUT HE IS GOING TO MAKE IT NONETHELESS.

4. IN SHORT, I HAVE ARGUED THAT WHATEVER MESSAGES OR INSTRUCTIONS AMBASSADOR BUNKER MAY RELAY FROM WASHINGTON, AND WHATEVER THIEU MAY SAY TO THE AMBASSADOR IN RETURN, THE GVN IS NOT GOING TO TURN A DEAF EAR TO FARK UNITS! REQUESTS FOR HELP IN FIGHTING AN AT LEAST TEMPORARILY COMMON ENEMY, NOR IS THE GVN COING TO PASS UP ANY REALLY PROMISING CHANCE TO GET IN A FEW LICKS ON ITS OWN. THIEU'S ATTITUDES ON THIS MATTER (SHARED B HIS SENIOR COLLEAGUES, PARTICULARLY THIS WITHIN THE GVN S MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT) AREA LARROWS FACTORS AND CONSIDERATION.

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	REASONING AND V	WOULD LIKE	TO KNOW IF WE	READ THIE	EU (AND THE GVI	(7)
	THE SAME WAY.					
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